“Revisionist history” means different things to different people. At its worst, it is not even really history. The worst recent example of revisionist history is the 1619 Project which was an activist project aimed at slandering the American experiment with half-truths. Writing by activists instead of historians it was eviscerated by real historians, including such heavyweights as Gordon Wood who critiqued it better than I ever could. True revisionist history serves a purpose though and at its best provides nuance to narratives that are, perhaps too optimistic or pessimistic or too supportive of government policy or too critical. Occasionally new information comes to light or perhaps new interpretations of old documents lead to renewed debate. In theory every generation rewrites history and comes closer to the truth. Reality, however, is not quite this simple and what in fact happens is that each historian reinterprets history to reflect the time period in which they live.
Cold War historiography for example began with the Orthodox historians who lived through World War II and the years immediately following it and, unsurprisingly, were adamantly pro-American/Allied Powers. The Soviet Union was to blame for the Cold War. This group was followed by the Revisionists who put more of the blame on Truman and the US arguing that Soviet moves into Eastern Europe were defensive in nature and in response to U.S. policies aimed at isolating the Soviet Union. The Post-Revisionists then arose attempting to bridge the gap between the two previous schools. Revisions to Cold War history continue to this day aided by the access to new archive material that started to become available following the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. As is the case with most history, some of it is good, some mediocre, and some bad. The interpretation I remain the most critical of though is that arguing that the US did not need to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki
The argument that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were unnecessary is presented in different ways including that it was morally wrong, that Japan was already beaten, and that the US bombed a defeated Japan to send a message and/or intimidate the Soviet Union. This primary problem with this interpretation is that it is based more on morality than on any existing documentation and that moral argument is steeped in presentism.
Focusing on facts, if a memo or meeting minutes existed stating something along the lines of “the war is over but let’s drop the bomb to scare the Ruskies” then there would be little to argue about. However, if it existed, we’d know about it because the historians making this argument would have published it. In this absence of this type of concrete proof historians present the revisionist argument by reinterpreting (disagreeing) with previous historians. The problem with this interpretation is there is plenty of data that points to the leaders basing their decision on casualty estimates. To put it another way, the leaders weighed the two plans, invade or bomb, and made a rational decision.
At the end of the war Japan still had 7 million troops stationed throughout the pacific, but 3.5 million of those were based on the Japanese home islands. Given the history of the battles fought in the Pacific, there was every reason to believe that Japan would have fought to “the last man” as they had done on nearly every island the US had invaded in the Pacific. Estimates based on prior battles indicated that between one quarter of a million and one million casualties would occur if the home Islands were invaded. That’s just the Allied casualties. Japanese casualties would have been equal to or higher than this number. Following the war interrogations of high-ranking Japanese staff officers proved that these beliefs were justified. General Douglas MacArthur’s O-2 staff reported:
“The strategists at Imperial General Headquarters believed that, if they could succeed in inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States in the Kyushu operation, convince the American people of the huge sacrifices involved in an amphibious invasion of Japan, and make them aware of the determined fighting spirit of the Japanese army and civilian population, they might be able to postpone, if not escape altogether, a crucial battle in the Kanto [Tokyo] area. In this way, they hoped to gain time and grasp an opportunity which would lead to the termination of hostility on more favorable terms than those which unconditional surrender offered.”
Given that an invasion would have resulted in between 500k and 2M casualties (minimums), the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (max total casualties 226,000) should be viewed, not as immoral, but rather as the best way to quickly bring the war to an end while also minimizing casualties (on both sides. Although I doubt the allies gave much consideration to limiting Japanese casualties).
A moral standpoint may be more difficult to debate but the evidence once again does not lead to the conclusion that the bombings were immoral.
Are we taking the position that “thou shalt not kill” and that all war is inherently evil? If so America and the Allies should never have resisted the Axis powers and there is nothing more to talk about. Of course, had this been the decision of the Allies, Japan would never have been bombed and we would not be debating the issue. We also would likely be writing the history of the very short conflict in either German or Japanese and countless millions would have been liquidated by the Nazi’s and Imperial Japanese as they rapidly conquered the pacifist nations unwilling to resist. Any suggestions that peaceful coexistence with either Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan is absurd given each empire’s stated goals and the atrocities already underway. One must bear in mind that the philosophical debates regarding Just War date back to before the dawn of Christianity.
Civilians should not be killed. Fair enough. The alternative to dropping the bombs was invading Japan (we’re going to ignore giving Imperial Japan the option of conditional surrender). Debating the two options requires an estimation of the deaths that would have occurred during an invasion. Or more precisely, which action would have resulted in more civilian deaths? Again, difficult to determine but it is known that under Japan’s “National Volunteer Compat Force” program an additional 28 million Japanese civilians were subject to conscription. Would their deaths have been morally acceptable because they were forced to put on army uniforms? What about the deaths that would have resulted from famine and disease that would no doubt have occurred during the long-drawn-out campaign that would have been necessary to pacify the home islands?
Civilians shouldn’t be targeted. Perhaps the one good moral argument. The problem is that I value “my family, relatives, and friends” much more than I value yours. Everyone does, and no democratically elected leader would have been able to make the argument that 226,000 enemy lives could have been spared if the Allies were willing to sacrifice a few million of their own troops. What’s more, bombing of civilians had started much earlier in the war and while “they started it” is not a sound moral argument, in an existential fight for survival, which World War II was, few have the luxury of taking the moral high ground.
The argument that the US dropped the bomb to send a message to the Soviet Union is not an unreasonable one. Relations between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Allies were already souring as the reasons for the two sides to ignore their ideological differences and remain friendly were quickly evaporating. However, it is, as they say, possible for two things to be true at the same time, that the bombs were dropped in an effort to end the war as quickly as possible with the message sent to the Soviets being an added bonus.
Conclusion
Would Imperial Japan have been defeated had the bombs not been dropped? Yes. However, revisionist historians attempts to label Imperial Japan as “helpless” and “defeated” are patently absurd. There is also an element of presentism at work in this argument. We have over 50 years of Cold War history that colors our views and understanding of nuclear weapons. We know how terrible they are because we have seen them tested and used. That was not the case in 1945. What’s more, we are not being forced to make this decision while are friends and family members are dying in a war we did not start. Taking the stance that a different decision should have been made looking back with our more complete knowledge and from the safety of our current position is a luxury that those making the decision in 1945 did not have. Given the expected casualties from an invasion, it is unlikely that the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could have been avoided unless Japan had surrendered before the bombs had fallen. There is a line from the movie “Fury” in which the character played by Brad Pitt explains the state of the war to a new soldier: “It will end, soon. But before it does, a lot more people gotta die.” That was the case with the war against Imperial Japan in 1945, the war was going to end and Japan was going to lose but a lot more people were going to have to die, the only question was whose people and how many?
You know, I have always been amused by this argument. It shows a fundamental lack of study of the subject.
We know exactly what would have happened if the bombs hadn’t been dropped, the Allies military leaders who didn’t know about the drew up plans.
For the Army and Marines, your article covered the basics quite well, so I won’t go into that.
The USAAF figured that they could keep burning Japanese cities every few days for the rest of 1945, slowly moving down in city size until they had forced so many people from their homes that starvation and disease would kill millions that winter and an invasion in the spring of 1946 would be much less costly.
My favorite, however, is the Navy’s “Operation Starvation.” Yes, that is the real name. You see, Japan is basically a mountain range with the highest peaks sticking out into the air. Over 80% of it is mountainous and grows very little food. The people also share most of their population with the most arable land. Furthermore, Japan in 1945 did not have the road or rail network to transport food from where it was grown to where it was eaten, instead, they depended on shipping. Operation Starvation consisted of the systematic destruction of that shipping capability through air, surface, subsurface, and mine warfare and had, by the time of the surrender, sunk or damaged something like 75% of Japan’s merchant tonnage.
Please think about what any of those three plans would have meant for the Japanese people. We might be living on a world in which Japanese is indeed, spoken only in hell.
“Civilians shouldn’t be targeted.” While noble many forget that in those days they need not be targeted to be killed collaterally. Many don’t realize that during D day more french civilians were accidentally killed by the allies than there were allies killed by Germans in the invasion. Thusly the unintentional civilian casualties in an invasion of Japan would have been extremely high. I also believe highest death toll of any raid on Japan, to include Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was the Tokyo fire bombing.